

29 November 1978

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MEMORANDUM FOR THE RECORD

SUBJECT: Conversation with the Secretary of State, 28 November 1978

1. The Secretary expressed his dismay at the recent newspaper articles on Iran and intelligence. He also expressed his and INR's full support and appreciation of the way relations between State and both the Agency and the Intelligence Community were working.


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- 3. We talked about the MIG-23s in Cuba, and I told him we had increased our estimate now to a certain nine with five of them D/Fs. It is the Secretary's general plan to make a statement before long—which he indicated he would be clearing with us and others—that this modest number and the Soviet assurance that they are not nuclear capable would be adequate for us, but that any more would be unacceptable. I said we could confirm that there is no evidence that these are nuclear capable, though we certainly couldn't certify that they are not. I also was concerned as to what he and I would say when pressed as to what the actual number is. I asked if there was any hope we could get them to wheel them out of the hangars for photographing perhaps in a way that it would not be obvious and there would be no publicity. He indicated he didn't think that was at all in the cards.
- 4. We talked about Iraq. Senator Cranston apparently had suggested that we should be doing more to open up relations with Iraq. The Secretary pointed out that we had made an overture over a year ago and the Iraqis

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5. We talked about Camp David. The hope at the moment is to get agreement on the text of the treaty without any more changes by Egypt, and then to concentrate on the side letter about linkage.

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7. I mentioned the DDO item just received that Keren had probably fallen to the Ethiopians in Eritrea. The Secretary asked if this was significant. I replied that it was not a major factor in itself, but reports that went with it that there was a renewal of fighting between the ELF and the EPLF would indicate to me there were possibly deeper difficulties here and that these might lead to a greater receptivity to negotiation. We discussed the impact of negotiation and both were concerned with the freeing of Ethiopian resources be used either or both in the Sudan and the Ogaden. In short, a negotiation that came to a reasonable solution was probably all right from the U.S. point of view, but the Secretary was particularly worried about reports we had already received of Ethiopian incursions into Sudan.

At this point, I discussed the degree of our knowledge of Somali intervention in the Ogaden and used the charts from the briefing.

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9. The Secretary said he supported our budget figure. I said I appreciated that. I went through the INTELSAT situation with him using figures from the material provided me, including the attached chart which I constructed from that. We might provide that chart back to

10. I discussed \_\_\_\_\_ and obtained his approval to go to Brzezinski on this. I had discussed it with Brzezinski today and told him I would be trying to get Cy's approval this evening, so we can take that up again next week.

11. I delivered the paper on Syrian/Iraqi rapprochement.

12. I delivered the paper on ZAPU/ZANU differences.

14. We talked about the ongoing work of the Newsom/Aaron/Carlucci group with respect to political reporting and \_\_\_\_\_\_ He indicated that State was studying longer-term ways in which we might have to change our responses in the area as a result of events in \_\_\_\_\_ such as reviewing our policy on providing military aid to other countries in the Gulf.

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In that connection, I expressed my concern at the tendency to turn too many projects over to Newsom, Aaron and Carlucci because he needed Newsom and I needed Carlucci to do their normal work and not just be on special working groups.

15. I discussed the briefing for the President this morning on Southeast Asia. He had already had a phone call from the President asking whether we should make some public statement regarding Vietnamese military actions against Cambodia (this is something that had come up in the briefing this morning). He was opposed to it. I said I concurred because it would be taking sides in a Soviet/Chinese issue and we didn't need to do that.

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- 16. I didn't get to talk about technical collection comparison. I think I'll skip that one.
- 17. I didn't get to talk about African trends. I think I'll skip that one.
- 18. I didn't get to talk about \_\_\_\_\_\_ I think I'll 25X1 skip that one.
  - 19. I didn't take up the INR budget as it didn't seem necessary.
- 20. I didn't get to read it first and soon.

  Leave that one in, but I have to 25X1
  - 23. I didn't take up Iraq on advice of NE Division.
  - 24. Good preparations. Good meeting.

STANSFIELD TURNER Director

Attachment

